


# Decision-making in energy markets under uncertainty: human-in-the-loop

Ricardo Bessa, [ricardo.j.bessa@inesctec.pt](mailto:ricardo.j.bessa@inesctec.pt)


INREC 2022 (International Ruhr Energy Conference 2022)

28<sup>th</sup> September 2022



- **Human-in-the-loop decision-making:** challenges
- **Classical paradigms** and market bidding
- **Human understanding** of forecast uncertainty value
- **Human interpretability** in energy trading
- Towards **new decision paradigms**
- Concluding remarks

# Human-in-the-loop decision-making: challenges




# Decision-making: single criterion




- Human participates *only* in the problem formulation
- The remaining process is technical, leading (hopefully) to the **optimal solution**
- Decision is embedded in the problem formulation (“**somehow**” is a **black-box** for the human)

Humans like to


- ✓ understand **cause-effect relation** in decision-making
- ✓ have a **sense of control** (critical for autonomous processes)



# Decision-making: multi-criteria




- Human participates in the problem formulation
- Human preferences must be integrated in the problem
- The process leads to a preferred solution



Iterative process  
(human-in-the-loop)

Interpretability is essential

# Decision-making under uncertainty



- ❑ Human participates in the problem formulation & uncertainty analysis
- ❑ The preferred solution results from the human preferences and risk attitude




Yet...

- \* uncertainty forecasts brings **complexity** and **unperceived value** to humans
- \*\* **trust** is fundamental to avoid algorithm aversion


# \* Complexity

Forecast for a wind power plant (Sotavento, Spain)


Physically-based temporal trajectories




Physically-based (marginal) forecast intervals



Simultaneous forecast intervals



AI-based (marginal) forecast intervals



# \* Complexity


- Decision under **risk**

*The decision maker has full information, in the sense that there is a subjective probability, i.e.,  $P(s_j|a_t)$  as the probability that  $s_j$  is the true state, if the alternative  $a_t$  is chosen*


- Decision under **uncertainty**

*The decision maker has no information (relevant to the decision) about the true state of nature*

P. Gärdenfors, "Forecasts, decisions and uncertain probabilities," Erkenntnis, vol. 14(2), pp. 159-181, 1979




In real-world scenarios, the decision maker has **partial information**



State-of-the-art uncertainty forecasts **are calibrated** (nominal-empirical probabilities  $\approx 0$ )



Calibration is quantified in a frequentist manner



We might need to consider first and second order probabilities (*probability of a probability*) - **ambiguity**

P. Gärdenfors (1979)



# \* Unperceived value




IEA Task 36 industry survey

Factors	Agree [%]	Not-Agree [%]
<u>Weather is one out of many uncertainty sources</u>	100	0
<u>Insufficient knowledge about tools and approaches</u>	53	47
<u>Fear that speculative planning may result in a loss</u>	64	36
Lack of staff to undertake the job	37	63
Lack of IT solutions	35	65
<u>More information may lead to slower decision making and loss of important time</u>	32	68
Flexibility in real-time staff resources would be desirable, but is not feasible	42	58
Company has access to confidential market information and is not allowed to speculate	33	67

inclusion of forecast uncertainty **does not necessarily mean lower cost or higher profit** if we just think in traditional performance metrics (total profit)

# \*\* Trust




## *key elements of trust*

**Source:** O. Vereschak, G. Bailly, B. Caramiaux, “How to evaluate trust in AI-assisted decision making? A survey of empirical methodologies,” CSCW, Oct. 2021

In the **outcome**: immerse decision makers in a state of vulnerability to feel that their decision matters, i.e., having something at **stake**

# Classical paradigms and market bidding



A. Botterud, J. Wang, Z. Zhou, R.J. Bessa, H. Keko, J.S. Akilimali, V. Miranda, "Wind power trading under uncertainty in LMP markets," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 27(2), pp. 894-903, May 2012

# Bidding in the Electricity Market

- Different rules (e.g., deviation penalties) and market sessions across countries

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{Profit, hour } h \\
 \downarrow \\
 \pi_h = \hat{p}_h^{DA} \cdot q_h^{DA} + \hat{p}_h^{RT} \cdot (\hat{q}_h^{RT} - q_h^{DA}) - pen \cdot |dev_h| \\
 \begin{array}{ccc}
 \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow \\
 \text{DA bid} & \text{real-time delivery} & \text{Deviation penalty}
 \end{array}
 \end{array}$$

DA price  $\downarrow$       real-time price  $\downarrow$        $dev_h$

- Representation of uncertainty: marginal distributions (e.g., quantiles, pdf, pmf) for each lead-time  $\rightarrow$  “uni-temporal” problem


# Classical Decision Paradigms

- We consider **three different decision paradigm**
- Expected profit – risk neutral decision-maker

$$\max_{q_{DA,h}} \sum_{m=1}^M \text{prob}_m \cdot \pi_h^m(q_{DA,h})$$

# Classical Decision Paradigms

Objective function:  $\text{Max } E(\text{Profit}) + w^*c\text{VaR}$




cVaR is the expected value of the profit below threshold,  $th$

Trade-off Analysis –  
Deterministic &  
Multicriteria

# Classical Decision Paradigms

Objective function: Max E(Utility)

Decision Maker's Preference (Utility Function)



$$U_h^m = \frac{1}{1-e^\beta} \left[ 1 - e^{\frac{\beta(\pi^m - \pi^{min})}{\pi^{max} - \pi^{min}}} \right]$$

$\beta = 0$ : neutral


$\beta < 0$ : risk averse

$\beta > 0$ : risk prone

Utility Theory – Stochastic & Single and Multicriteria


# Results for a Wind Power Plant in U.S.

Total 4-month profit versus hourly cVaR, no deviation penalty





# Human understanding of forecast uncertainty value



Corinna Möhrlen, R.J. Bessa, N. Fleischhut, "A decision-making experiment under wind power forecast uncertainty," *Meteorological Applications*, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. e2077, May/June 2022

# Key questions for the experiment



Do decision-makers make better decisions with information about forecast uncertainty, and in which situations?



Do they decide more risk averse or risk prone?



Do probabilistic forecasts allow better learning from feedback?

# Decision-making experiment

## Experiment 1 (2020)

Scenario: whether a [high-speed shutdown \(HSSD\)](#) takes place within the forecast horizon in 12 cases

Decision: whether to trade 50% or 100% of the generating power of an offshore wind power plant

### Decision Tools:

- 3 deterministic forecasts for wind power and 1 for wind speed
- probabilistic forecast showing wind power and wind speed marginal forecast intervals

## Experiment 2 (2021-2022) – on-going

Scenario:


- 2 x times 20 cases (20 deterministic and 20 probabilistic cases)
- the participants make decisions based on either deterministic or probabilistic forecasts
- request on participant's confidence level regarding their decision
- real-time environment, e.g. participants may be surprised by forecasts that fail to warn or over-predict

### Decision Tools:

Same as experiment 1


**Link for the 2<sup>nd</sup> experiment:** <https://arc-vlab.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/wind-power>

# Experiment and cost function



**Cost Function**


Trading	HSSD	No HSSD
100%	-5.000	5.000
50%	0	2.500




# Experiment main results

Conducted with 105 participants from the energy industry

Slightly higher income with probabilistic forecasts



Proportion of correct decisions





## Other results


- In 9 out of 12 situations, more than 10% of the participants changed their mind
- In three cases 30%–23% changed their mind, and in one case (Situation 1) 48% did
- 93% preferred some type of probabilistic forecast

# Experiment main results

Proportion of participants taking the risky option (trading 100%)




# Human interpretability in energy trading



K. Parginos, R.J. Bessa, S. Camal, G. Kariniotakis, "Interpretable data-driven solar power plant trading strategies," IEEE ISGT Europe 2022, Novi Sad, Serbia, 10-12 Oct. 2022.


# What is interpretability?





*“ The ability to explain or to present a model output in understandable terms to a human”, Doshi-Velez & Been Kim, 2017*






# AI/ML frameworks for RES trading





# Main interpretable approaches



# Interpretability & prescriptive model in trading




# Symbolic Regression



# Trading problem formulation

## Ad-Hoc



## Definitions

$$y_{SR} = G(Z_{E,\theta}, X)$$

$$Z_{opt} = \underset{\{Z_{E,\theta} \in \Phi\}}{\operatorname{argmin}} L(G(Z_{E,\theta}, X), y)$$

Formulation of fitness function  $L$  to  
optimize trading value

$y = p^E$  : Actual energy produced

$\lambda^\uparrow, \lambda^\downarrow$ : Imbalance prices

$$L = \underbrace{[-\lambda^\uparrow (p^E - y_{SR})^- + \lambda^\downarrow (p^E - y_{SR})^+]}_{\text{imbalance cost}}$$

## Two Approaches


Non-Clustered Data

$SR_{Global}$

Clustered Data

$SR_{(Low,Medium,High)}$


# Case-study: wind energy day-ahead bidding



We can identify the key features that drive our model, as well as how they interact with each other in different wind speed conditions

# Case-study: wind energy day-ahead bidding

4 x 2MW wind turbines, located in France (period of March 2019-May 2020)




Selected Strategy	Total Revenue (€)				Comparison w./ Ref. Bidding
	$WT_1$	$WT_2$	$WT_3$	$WT_4$	
Perfect hindsight	272.209	264.449	254.960	253.068	7.15%
Reference bidding (opt. quantile)	257.158	241.241	238.468	238.145	0.00%
$SR_{Global}$	238.632	228.124	219.630	219.744	-7.06%
$SR_{(Low,Medium,High)}$	250.051	241.338	232.002	231.072	-2.11%

## Reference model (opt. quantile)

$$\alpha_t^* = \frac{\lambda^\downarrow}{\lambda^\uparrow + \lambda^\downarrow}$$


optimal bid (min expected imbalance cost) is given by  $F^{-1}(\alpha_t^*)$

# Towards new decision paradigms







# Revised decision framework



# Confidence-based decisions



Uncertainty forecasts with a larger spread can be helpful in catching low-probability-high-impact events, but can lead to expensive decisions due to high uncertainty








Narrow forecast intervals can on the other hand lead a decision-maker to over-confidence in a decision

Hill (2013). Confidence and decision. Games and Economic Behavior, 82, 675-692

# Framework applied to electrical grid management


Probability of a congestion for day D+1 (lead time:  $t+30|t$ )  
> Decide now (i.e., “reserve” DER flexibility) or wait?

**meta-forecast:** forecast the uncertainty of the “future” forecasts for  $t+18|t$  &  $t+2|t$




# Meta-forecasting


## Gradient Boosting Trees






Forecasted generated with 0h00 NWP  
+  
Features characterizing uncertainty level (IQR, forecasted quantiles, stdev.)




## ANN




## RNN



# Application in energy markets




# Concluding remarks



# Concluding remarks

- Different levels of information abstraction might be needed for trading under forecast uncertainty
- Revise traditional decision-making process in the context of **Trust**
- Improve risk perception via transparent representations of information and **stakes** (*vulnerabilities*)
- Integrate model confidence and reaction to failure
- Temporal dimension of decisions is frequently forgotten
- Hybridization of traditional decision-making theory, operations research and ML

from knowledge  
production to  
science-based  
innovation



### Acknowledgements

- ❑ Manuel Matos (INESC TEC)
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- ❑ Nadine Fleischhut (Max Planck Institute)
- ❑ Audun Botterud (MIT)



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